

# Connecting Human and Natural Systems: The Role of Agent-Based Models



Funding:  
ONR MURI,  
NSF WSC & Coastal SEES

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Vanderbilt University


CSDMS Annual Meeting  
26 May 2017

## The value of applying simple models to complex problems

- Black-box versus glass-box modeling
  - Large, complex models are difficult for others to understand, even when source code is available.
  - Simple models may sacrifice fidelity to observations in favor of transparency:
- Simple models to identify important dynamics
  - Identify what to study in greater detail
- Case Studies:
  1. Participatory agent-based simulations for public engagement on flood hazards
  2. Coupled human natural systems:
    - Tidal river management in Bangladesh

# Simple models to identify important questions

- Crop-choice by farmers in Sri Lanka
  - Rice vs. green vegetables
  - Variation by reservoir condition and private irrigation wells
- Different results for different decision models
- Implication: Further research to understand farmers' decision processes under risk & uncertainty



# Participatory Agent-Based Simulations for Public Engagement with Flood Control

*Floods are "acts of God," but  
flood losses are largely  
acts of man.*

— Gilbert F. White

Collaborators: C. Brady (VU), J. Camp (VU),  
J.J. Nay (VU), P. Sengupta (U. Calgary)

The University of Chicago

## HUMAN ADJUSTMENT TO FLOODS

A GEOGRAPHICAL APPROACH TO THE  
FLOOD PROBLEM IN THE  
UNITED STATES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY  
OF THE DIVISION OF THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES  
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR  
OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY  
JUNE, 1942

*Research Paper No. 29*

By  
GILBERT FOWLER WHITE

**FLOOD PLAIN STUDIES FILE**

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS  
1945


# Participatory Agent-Based Simulations

- Interactive simulations:
  - Trial and error with prompt feedback.
  - Learning from experience
- Participatory simulations:
  - Multiple players interacting, explore social aspects of emergent phenomena.
- Integrate participatory and agent-based approaches:
  - Players control high-level policy decisions.
  - Automated agents simulate low-level response by population

# The Model

- Cities along a stylized river
  - Choice **not** to use real geography
- Particle hydrodynamics for channel & overland flow
- Agent-based land markets for development, property value
- Nonlinear time:
  - Slows down during flood events
- Players:
  - Planners for neighboring cities
  - Receive tax revenue
  - Decide on flood wall construction

<https://github.com/pratim/Floodpartsim>



# Master Interface

setup

LogIn (but no building)

go

delay 0.000

go(once)

Make Policy Changes

recolor land

Color-By  
value

show-all-floodplanes

Open 3D Flood View

Open 3D Plan View

Update 3D Views

Setup Floodplane Trials


Run Floodplane Trials

trials-index 7

flood-type 48


Land Year 20	Currently.... Formulating Policy Responses	population (k) 3378
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ticks: 1880 3D




levee-ht-1 0.5 extent-1 3 center-levee-at-1 lowest bank altitude	levee-ht-2 1.5 extent-2 4 center-levee-at-2 lowest bank altitude	levee-ht-3 1.4 extent-3 10 center-levee-at-3 lowest bank altitude
Tax Base 1 822.6 total flood damage (k\$) 25389	Tax Base 2 870.6 total flood damage (k\$) 8422.3	Tax Base 3 811 total flood damage (k\$) 12625.4

**income-distribution of new settlers**



**population level over time (pop in thousands)**




On  
 Off devalue-land-based-on-recent-flooding

Map color indicates property value


# Sequence

- 20-year run
  - Stochastic rain, river discharge
  - Automated land development
  - Slow time for floods (20+ year stage)
- Every 20 years:
  - Discussion, levee building
- After 100 years:
  - Generate 200-year flood





# Flood Event and Damage Map



Land Year	Currently....	population (k)
55	Simulating Flood Event	6851

levee-ht-1 1.8

extent-1 9

center-levee-at-1

highest land value ▼

levee-ht-2 1.5

extent-2 7

center-levee-at-2

highest land value ▼

levee-ht-3 2.0

extent-3 13

center-levee-at-3

highest land value ▼

Tax Base 1	Tax Base 2	Tax Base 3
1338	1352.6	1294.6
total flood damage (k\$)	total flood damage (k\$)	total flood damage (k\$)
31388.7	3154.6	9374.1

Land Year	Currently....	population (k)
55	Simulating Flood Event	6851

**User Message**

The flood caused the following DAMAGE: Group 1: 33.4, Group 2: 1451.8, Group 3: 1642.2

levee-ht-1 1.8

extent-1 9

center-levee-at-1

highest land value ▼

levee-ht-2 1.5

extent-2 7

center-levee-at-2

highest land value ▼

levee-ht-3 2.0

extent-3 13


center-levee-at-3

highest land value ▼

Tax Base 1	Tax Base 2	Tax Base 3
1338	1352.6	1294.6
total flood damage (k\$)	total flood damage (k\$)	total flood damage (k\$)
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# Experiments

- Pre-service social studies teachers
  - Groups of 2-3
  - Sequence:
    - Pre-questionnaire and briefing
    - Participatory simulation exercise
    - Post-questionnaire and debriefing
- Unexpected results:
  - Students became very emotionally engaged
    - “This is terrifying!”  
(covering mouth and gasping)
  - Emotional engagement may facilitate learning
    - Damasio, Slovic
  - Interactive simulations facilitate emotional engagement
    - Weizenbaum, “Eliza” (1966)




## Coupled Human-Natural Systems in Bangladesh

Faculty, Students,  
Postdocs from  
Vanderbilt University  
Columbia University  
Louisiana State U.  
University of Colorado  
Texas A&M  
Karlsruhe Inst. Tech.  
Dhaka University  
Jahangirnagar U.  
Khulna U.

Sediment modeling by C. Tasich (VU)  
Funding: ONR MURI, NSF Coastal SEES

# Coastal Embankment Project: 1960s-70s

123 enclosed "polders"



# Embankments and Sluice Gates



# Forgotten Wisdom of the Past


**“Embankments ... are likely to make the situation far worse in the long run”**

—P.C. Mahalanobis (1927)

**“If the river could flow properly, then everything will be all right.”**

— Farmer displaced by floods (Sept. 2011)

# Beel Bhaina 2001



# Beels Bhaina & Kukshia 2010





# Beel Kukshia 2013



# Public opposition to Tidal River Management



Photo Credit: BanglaNews24 2 June 2012

## Failure of government drainage rehabilitation project

- ADB Project evaluation:
  - No buy-in from local communities
  - Failure to compensate farmers for losses
  - *“Lack of understanding of an indigenous knowledge base”*
- *Local farmer:*
  - “The [government] engineer ... would not accept our suggestion because he thought it was given by the non-experts!”*

# Challenges

- Representing local decision-making:
  - History: informal grass-roots activism vs. imposed government program
  - Explore role of voting and negotiation for building popular support
- Inequality:
  - Unequal land holdings in size, quality
    - Higher elevation vs. lower elevation
  - Complex land tenure:
    - Tenant farmers, share-croppers, “dummy” owners, etc.

# Modeling challenge



- Limited data:
  - Qualitative social-science field-work  
(Key-informant interviews, focus-group discussions)
  - Review of qualitative social-science literature
  - Measurements of physical system elsewhere,  
but not near beels  
(Topographic surveys, tide gauges,  
suspended sediment, sedimentation rates)
- For designing simple models, narratives can be more useful than quantitative survey data

# Modeling Tidal River Management



- Simple model of coupled human-natural system
  - Simple model of sediment deposition
  - Stylized representation of agricultural impact
  - Add human dimension: community decision-making
- This work:
  - Stylized models: informed by empirical data, but not calibrated
  - No attempts so far at quantitative validation
  - Basic framework in place
    - Future work will explore social, economic, political dynamics

Elevation



Breach









Rice yield (breach closed)








Rice yield (Breach open)



Initial conditions



After one year breach




After two year breach

# Simulating community decisions


- Simplified:
  - Not based on actual decision procedures
  - Informed by considerations expressed in key-informant interviews
- Voting:
  - Instant-runoff in case of no majority in first round
- Trading:
  - Farmers “trade votes”:
    - Winners offer compensation to losers to support choice
    - Continuous double-auction until a majority emerges




# Discounted net-present value of n-years of breaches with 5-year horizon



1 year



2 years



3 years

- No majority for any option
  - Most people are dissatisfied regardless of outcome
- If winners can compensate losers, a majority emerges for 1 year breach, with fewer unhappy farmers